what prompted kennedy to push for changes in civil rights prior to 1964?

Speech by President John F. Kennedy regarding ceremonious rights

Report to the American People on Civil Rights

President Kennedy delivering his speech communication while sitting at the Resolute desk in the Oval Function
Date	June 11, 1963; 58 years ago  (1963-06-11)
Time	8:00–8:13 PM EDT
Duration	13:24
Venue	Oval Office, White House
Location	Washington, D.C., U.s.a.
Coordinates	38°53′52″N 77°02′11″W  /  38.8977°N 77.0365°W  / 38.8977; -77.0365 Coordinates: 38°53′52″Due north 77°02′11″W  /  38.8977°Northward 77.0365°W  / 38.8977; -77.0365
Theme	Civil rights
Website	Study to the American People on Civil Rights, xi June 1963

The Study to the American People on Ceremonious Rights was a speech on civil rights, delivered on radio and television by United States President John F. Kennedy from the Oval Office on June 11, 1963 in which he proposed legislation that would later on get the Civil Rights Human action of 1964. Expressing civil rights as a moral upshot, Kennedy moved past his previous appeals to legality and asserted that the pursuit of racial equality was a but cause. The accost signified a shift in his assistants's policy towards strong support of the civil rights movement and played a significant part in shaping his legacy as a proponent of ceremonious rights.

Kennedy was initially cautious in his support of ceremonious rights and desegregation in the United States. Concerned that dramatic actions would alienate legislators in the segregated southern United states, he limited his activities on the effect and bars his justifying rhetoric to legal arguments. Equally his term continued, African Americans became increasingly impatient with their lack of social progress and racial tensions escalated. The ascent militancy of the civil rights movement troubled white Americans and the deteriorating state of affairs reflected negatively on the United States away. Kennedy came to conclude that he had to offer stronger back up for civil rights, including the enactment of new legislation that would ensure desegregation in the commercial sector.

On June 11, 1963, federal officials integrated the University of Alabama. Kennedy decided that information technology was an opportune moment to speak about civil rights, and instructed Ted Sorensen to draft a speech that he could evangelize on television receiver that evening. Chaser Full general Robert F. Kennedy and his deputy, Burke Marshall, assisted Sorensen, who finished shortly before President Kennedy was due to begin speaking at 8:00 PM.

Groundwork [edit]

From the onset of his term, President John F. Kennedy was relatively silent on the issue of African-American civil rights in the United States, preferring executive action to legislative solutions. He was cautious not to distance the South, marked by substantial segregation and racial discrimination, by infringing upon states' rights.^[i] He also wanted to avoid upsetting members of Congress, every bit he was already struggling to secure their support for most of his New Frontier domestic programs.^[two] Notwithstanding, Kennedy's position on ceremonious rights had begun to evolve during the Freedom Rides of 1961, when African Americans traveled along segregated charabanc routes in the South. Though he dispatched federal marshals to baby-sit confronting the racial violence of the events, he publicly stressed that his actions were rooted in legality and not morality; American citizens had a constitutional right to travel, and he was but enforcing that right.^[1] Regardless, several activists encouraged the President to discuss the "moral issue" of civil rights in American society. According to aide Harris Wofford, Kennedy felt that he was the strongest supporter of ceremonious rights who had ever held the presidency, and he was irritated by such appeals.^[iii] Wofford advised him, "What [President Dwight D. Eisenhower] never did was to requite articulate moral expression to the issues involved. The only constructive time for such moral leadership is during an occasion of moral crunch. This is the time when your words mean most. Negro leaders feel sorely the absence of any such statement."^[4]

Federal agents being transported to the University of Mississippi in military vehicles to maintain social club

Kennedy devoted a significant amount of his 1962 Land of the Union Address to the topic of civil rights, but he confined his rhetoric to legal themes and conveyed that present legislation sufficed his administration's efforts to combat racial discrimination.^[2] In September, James Meredith, a black homo, enrolled at the University of Mississippi. Although Kennedy used federal troops to guarantee Meredith's safety and attendance, he publicly downplayed the violence that had occurred and made no changes to his legislative calendar. Despite being pleased that the federal regime had protected Meredith, ceremonious rights leader Martin Luther Male monarch Jr. was reportedly "deeply disappointed" in the President.^[v] Following the failure of the Albany Movement later that yr, many ceremonious rights activists believed that Kennedy "was more than concerned with quieting the ceremonious rights movement down than removing the practices it opposed."^[6]

In 1963, an increasing number of white Americans, troubled past the rising of more militant black leaders like Malcolm 10, feared that the civil rights movement would take a violent plow.^[6] The depiction of racial violence in the media likewise benefited the Soviet Matrimony's Cold State of war propaganda and damaged the United States' image abroad, which greatly concerned Kennedy.^[one] He determined that advisable legislation would enable the administration to pursue suits through the court system and get the trouble "out of the streets" and away from international spectators.^[7] In Feb, after receiving a report from the Civil Rights Commission on racial bigotry, Kennedy sent a message to Congress calling for a ceremonious rights bill on the 28th.^[eight] In addition to the suggested economic and diplomatic benefits, he justified his legislation's measures to remove institutional racism because "higher up all, [racism] is incorrect."^[6] This marked the first fourth dimension that Kennedy discussed civil rights in expressly moral terms.^[nine] Regardless, the proposal garnered a flat response.^[10] Civil rights leaders were disappointed in the bill equally it focused mainly on voting rights, and critics believed a bolder proposal was needed to end discrimination for African Americans.^[11] The Southern Christian Leadership Briefing concluded that the Kennedy assistants would demand to be forced to fully face racial problems. To practice then, the Conference organized a series of demonstrations in April in Birmingham, Alabama, viewed past activists as one of the most segregated cities in the U.s., which was designed to create a crunch that would crave the President's involvement.^[12] The fierce crackdown against demonstrators that occurred in May disturbed Kennedy, but he refrained from directly intervening because he did not believe he had a legal ground to do so.^{[half dozen]} The civil conflict attracted global attention, specially from African leaders who were scheduled to gather for a conference in Addis Ababa.^[13]

After the bombing of King's house on May 12, Kennedy delivered a short radio and television receiver address and, in keeping with his previous legal arguments, he promised that his administration would "do whatever must be done to preserve order, to protect the lives of its citizens, and to uphold the law of the land." Meanwhile, Liberal Republicans in Congress proposed legislation that would outlaw segregationist practices. Nelson Rockefeller, a possible contender in the 1964 presidential ballot, suggested that he would effort to raise money to bail King out of a Birmingham jail (King had been arrested for protesting). With such potential rivals threatening to accept the initiative on ceremonious rights, Kennedy became convinced that legislative activeness on the matter was a "political and moral necessity."^[14] His brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, was compelled by the events in Birmingham to back up a legislative solution, though most of his other advisers remained unconvinced. On May 22, the President told the press that law "is non a matter of choice" and that "as a result of recent developments" he was "because whether any additional proposals [would] be made to Congress ... We hope to run across if we tin can develop a legal remedy".^[15] Nine days later he resolved over the objection of some of his advisers to propose a new civil rights bill being crafted by the Section of Justice, though the details of the legislation had yet to be finalized.^[16]

Prelude [edit]

On May 21, 1963 a federal district approximate ruled that the University of Alabama had to allow two black students, James Hood and Vivian Malone, to be admitted for its summertime courses, starting in June. Alabama Governor George Wallace was determined to make at least a public display of opposing the gild.^[17]

As the ensuing standoff intensified, Kennedy debated with his staff over the value of giving a speech on the thing.^[a] He himself was unsure of the idea, and his senior directorate were opposed to it except his brother, who supported the proposition.^[19] In a telephone conversation with presidential speechwriter Ted Sorensen on June 3, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson insisted that ceremonious rights leaders wanted "moral delivery, and that will exercise more to satisfy them than [legislation]. [Kennedy] should stick to the moral issue and he should practice it without equivocation ... what the Negroes are really seeking is moral strength."^[20] He also suggested that the President should appear on telly with an interracial armed services honour guard and contend that if there was an equal expectation for military service in the Us, then United States citizens should exist treated as in their state.^[21] In apprehension that the President might get forrard with a response, the Attorney Full general had directed his recently-hired speechwriter, Richard Yates, to produce a typhoon. Yates began writing on the evening of June 9.^[22] Hours after giving his American University voice communication on the following day,^[nineteen] President Kennedy met with Sorensen, Kenneth O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien, and Robert Kennedy in the White Business firm to hash out the issue.^[23] The latter said, "Well, we've got a draft which doesn't fit all these points, simply it's something to work with, and at that place'due south some pretty practiced sentences and paragraphs."^[19] The President then concluded the meeting, saying, "It will help us get prepare anyway, considering nosotros may want to practice it tomorrow."^[24] Meanwhile, Rex participated in a television interview which was to be printed on the front folio of The New York Times the following morning. Comparison Kennedy's civil rights policy to Eisenhower's, Rex said that the President had substituted "an inadequate approach for a miserable 1" and admonished him to discuss the moral dimensions of U.s.a.' racial issues.^[25]

Governor George Wallace (left) facing off with Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach (right) at the University of Alabama

On June 11, Governor Wallace stood in the doorway of Foster Auditorium at the University of Alabama to prevent the black students from registering for classes.^[19] Shortly later on apex, Kennedy, unsure of what Wallace would do, requested for the Big Three tv networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) to articulate time to broadcast a argument at 8:00 p.m.^[26] White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger fulfilled the task, in the process alerting the two largest national wire services, the Associated Press and United Press International.^[27] Less than 3 hours later the standoff began, Wallace yielded to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and National Guard Full general Henry 5. Graham.^[nineteen] Kennedy and his staff watched the situation resolve on tv in the White House subsequently. Sorensen figured that with the confrontation over, no speech would exist given. However, Kennedy idea that the moment was opportune to educate the public on civil rights and follow through with advisable legislation. Turning his chair towards Sorensen, Kennedy said, "We better give that civil rights spoken communication this evening."^[28] That was over the objection of O'Brien, who thought that a speech would galvanize southern opposition and stall Kennedy'south legislative calendar.^[29] Deputy Chaser General Burke Marshall said of Robert Kennedy's influence on the decision, "He urged it, he felt it, he understood it, and he prevailed. I don't call up in that location was anybody in the Cabinet—except the President himself—who felt that way on these issues, and the President got information technology from his brother."^[30] Historian Carl Brauer argued that the near important cistron in Kennedy's pick was his own perception of his reputation and goal to exist viewed equally a decisive leader, which had been compromised by the events in Birmingham.^[31]

With simply approximately 2 hours until the broadcast at 8:00 p.m.,^[b] no work had been done on a speech.^[c] Afterwards consulting the President on what he wanted to say, Sorensen and several others, including recently-arrived Robert Kennedy and Marshall (the President had chosen his brother to inform him of his decision to evangelize a speech^[34]), withdrew to the Cabinet Room to piece of work on a draft.^[28] Sorensen was broken-hearted about the borderline he had to meet, just Robert Kennedy assured him, "Don't worry. We accept a lot of practiced material over at the Justice Department that we can ship to you."^[35]

At around seven:00 p.m., President Kennedy checked on the group's progress. Sorensen had managed to create two drafts, one incomplete, and was still revising them. Kennedy remarked, "C'mon Burke, y'all must have some ideas."^[28] He also contradistinct part of the text, mindful not to provoke Southerners, changing Sorensen'south "A social revolution is at hand" and "Merely the pace is still shamefully wearisome" to "A great change is at hand" and "Merely the step is very slow," respectively. According to James Hood, the President called him at some point during the drafting process to ask for his opinion on an excerpt of the spoken communication or his thoughts on how it would be received.^{[36] [d]} At 7:40 p.thousand., the Kennedy brothers met in the Oval Office to outline an ad-lib argument in instance Sorensen was unable to finish a speech communication. The President wrote notes on an envelope and available scrap paper.^[26] Four minutes before viii:00 p.g., Sorensen entered the room and presented him with a typhoon.^[e] Kennedy looked over the oral communication and dictated final changes to his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, as did Sorensen with his own secretary, who both then attempted to type up finished pieces. They were not completed earlier the deadline.^[38] Kennedy told Sorensen after that evening, "For the showtime time, I thought I was going to have to go off the cuff."^[26] Robert Kennedy suggested that his brother however improvise parts of the spoken language, afterwards proverb, "I recollect that probably, if he had given information technology [entirely] extemporaneously, it would take been as good or better."^[28]

Content [edit]

John F. Kennedy delivering his spoken communication before telly cameras

Kennedy read the prepared portion of his speech from pages placed in a shallow lectern on his desk.^[37] An American flag stood in the background behind him.^[21] He spoke for 13 minutes and 24 seconds.^[39] Associate Printing Secretarial assistant Andrew Hatcher oversaw the circulate in the Oval Office.^[37]

Kennedy began by briefly reviewing the integration of the University of Alabama,^[26] the event that provided him his reason for delivering the speech.^[37] He stated that he ordered the National Guard to the higher "to deport out the final and unequivocal club of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Alabama."^[forty] He utilized the discussion "Alabama" four times in his opening to emphasize that the matter was a country problem resolved by the federal regime only at the behest of internal land elements. He also commended the educatee body of the university for behaving "peacefully" throughout the event, in contrast to the students who resisted the integration of the University of Mississippi.^[37] He then connected his message with "existing decision" past associating information technology with established American principles:^[41]

This nation was founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal and that the rights of every man are macerated when the rights of one man are threatened.

From there, Kennedy took on a global perspective; he mentioned that the United states of america military recruited nonwhites to serve abroad and added that for their equal expectation to serve they were entitled to equal handling inside the land.^[26] He surmised, "Nosotros preach liberty around the earth, and we mean it ... but are we to say to the world, and, much more importantly to each other, that this is the land of the complimentary except for the Negroes?"^[42]

Careful not to levy excessive fault upon the South, Kennedy connected, "This is non a sectional issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in every city, in every State of the Wedlock, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that threatens the public rubber."^[43]

In his speech, Kennedy called Americans to recognize civil rights as a moral crusade to which all people demand to contribute and was "as clear as the American Constitution."^[44] He conveyed how the proposed legislation would lead the nation to end discrimination against African Americans. Information technology would likewise provide equal treatment to all African Americans.^[44]

Kennedy read most of the speech verbatim^[f] merely he dropped Sorensen'south ending and improvised the last eight paragraphs.^[46]

Aftermath [edit]

Immediately post-obit the accost, Kennedy left the Oval Office and at 8:19 p.thousand., he sat downwards for dinner upstairs.^[47] Meanwhile, the White Firm was flooded by approximately 1000 responding telegrams, of which two thirds expressed appreciation. Most of the messages from the S were disapproving.^[48] Kennedy afterwards had adviser Louis E. Martin read some of them to him.^[49] The Attorney Full general too received mail, much of it expressing anti-civil rights sentiments.^[50] The State Section issued copies of the speech to all American diplomatic posts with specific instructions from the President and Secretarial assistant of State Dean Rusk on how the cloth was to be shared with the international community.^[51]

After that night, ceremonious rights activist Medgar Evers, who had been listening to Kennedy'due south remarks on the radio, was assassinated as he returned to his home in Jackson, Mississippi, which immediately drew domestic attention away from the event.^{[52] [43]} Similar the accost, nevertheless, the murder brought renewed emphasis to civil rights problems and contributed to a growing sense of national urgency to take action.^[53]

Reception [edit]

I think the spoken communication that President Kennedy made was forceful. He was the starting time president to say that the question of civil rights was a moral effect. He reminded us what it was like to exist black or white in the American South, in that speech. I listened to every give-and-take of that spoken language.

—Civil rights leader John Lewis^[54]

Martin Luther Male monarch Jr. watched the accost with Walter East. Fauntroy in Atlanta. When information technology was over, he jumped up and declared, "Walter, tin can you believe that white human non simply stepped upwards to the plate, he hit it over the fence!" He and then sent a telegram to the White House: "I have just listened to your speech to the nation. Information technology was one of the most eloquent[,] profound, and unequivocal pleas for justice and freedom of all men always fabricated past any President. You spoke passionately for moral issues involved in the integration struggle."^[47] King had been working with other black civil rights leaders to organize a "March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom" in August. They decided to reorient the focus of the demonstration to put pressure on Congress—and not Kennedy's administration—to take action.^[47] The executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Roy Wilkins, stated that while Kennedy had done well in explaining the moral issue of bigotry, he had failed to address inequality in the workplace adequately.^[iv] Wilkins subsequently said, however, "This was the message I had waited to hear from him. I fell asleep that dark feeling new confidence. For the showtime time in years, real change seemed to be at paw."^[47] Writer James Baldwin and other activists who had met with the Attorney Full general in May to encourage the Kennedy administration to be more supportive of ceremonious rights received the address positively.^[55] Jackie Robinson, a prominent black Republican and skeptic of Kennedy, announced that he would vote to re-elect the President in 1964.^[43] The spoken language also moved Mildred Loving, a black adult female married to a white homo, to write Robert Kennedy to inquire if the administration's legislative proposals would include protection for interracial couples.^[56] The Attorney General suggested for her to seek help from the American Civil Liberties Spousal relationship, the organization that later brought the legal challenge to Virginia'southward anti-miscegenation law on Loving's behalf before the Supreme Court in the landmark 1967 instance Loving 5. Virginia.^[57] Other civil rights activists feared that Kennedy'southward speech communication was delivered too late to adjourn the increasing violence in their motility.^[58]

Robert Kennedy speaking to civil rights demonstrators in front end of the Justice Department on June 14

The morning afterwards the broadcast, a console, chastened by Richard Heffner, discussed the content of the address on the Metromedia programme The American Experience. Participants in the televised debate included Nation of Islam leader Malcolm X, New York editor of Ebony Allan Morrison, Congress of Racial Equality executive director James Farmer, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference executive director Wyatt Tee Walker.^[59] Several observers noted the historical significance of the speech; The Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky wrote that information technology would "surely rank as one of the landmark public documents," and the St. Louis Mail service-Acceleration noted, "President Kennedy's moving entreatment to the censor of America should be regarded as one of the major achievements of the civil rights struggle."^[lx] The New York Times published an editorial, which argued that while the President had initially "moved too slowly and with little testify of deep moral commitment" in regards to ceremonious rights, he "at present demonstrate[d] a genuine sense of urgency most eradicating racial bigotry from our national life."^[61] The Nation remarked that Kennedy had "let two [genies] out of their respective bottles on successive days" (referencing the American University speech of June x). A Newsweek writer described his deportment as the "politics of courage."^[51] Favorable editorials were printed in The New Yorker, The New Republic, and Time. ^[62] Other publications expressed timid approval of the address.^[threescore] The Wall Street Journal criticized Kennedy's approach, objecting to his harsh language that gave the impression that "90 percent of the American people are engaged in a biting and unremitting oppression of the other 10 percentage." It warned that the speech could tarnish the United States' image abroad, asking, "What is anyone to think when the nation'southward highest vocalism speaks of the conditions of Negroes as little more than slavery?" The Journal argued that Kennedy should take appealed for moderation and respect for law, maintaining, "The weather are not so grievous that the whole nation must be worked into a frenzy which can aggravate tensions."^[63] A political cartoon was printed in the Hartford Courant, mocking the President's appeals to the public by showing him pointing his finger at an audience while declaring, "And I Do Mean You!"^[39]

International reaction to the accost was very positive.^[51] United States Ambassador to Federal democratic republic of ethiopia Edward Thousand. Korry wrote to the President that his speech had caused a "quick turnaround in attitudes" in the African state; Emperor Haile Selassie reportedly thought the remarks to be "masterpieces." Korry besides sent Kennedy an editorial from the Ethiopian Herald which referred to him as "the Abraham Lincoln of the Democratic Political party" and celebrated that the federal government "in the person of John F. Kennedy, has at long last come out in [defense] of the Constitution." The Soviet Wedlock ignored the event and continued to assail American racism every bit the product of commercialism.^[64]

In the U.s., Kennedy'southward approval rating among southern whites immediately dropped.^[65] In belatedly May, he had the approval of 52% of southerners, but later on the voice communication, he had only 33%.^[62] His ratings later made a partial recovery.^[65] The number of Americans who thought Kennedy was forcing integration "as well fast" went from 36% in May to 48% in July.^[62] Republicans speculated that a northern white "backlash" would befall the President and condemn his proposal to failure.^[66] African-Americans' view of Kennedy shifted positively, with one September poll suggesting he would have 95% of the black vote in an election confronting bourgeois Senator Barry Goldwater and significantly more black electoral support than Rockefeller.^[65] Nevertheless, satisfaction among the black community was not across the board; on June 14, 3,000 protesters gathered outside the Justice Department to demand the hiring of more black employees. This irritated the Attorney General, who felt that his blood brother was facing increased criticism for actions taken on his advice. He promised the oversupply, "Individuals would be hired according to their ability, not their color" and reiterated the message of the President's oral communication, calling for an end to discrimination.^[61]

I got a call at two in the morning from Memphis, it was some men in a bar and they said they but wanted to let me know what they felt. 'Nosotros don't want to eat with [African Americans], nosotros don't desire to go to school with them, nosotros don't even want to go to church with them.' I said, 'Do y'all want to become to heaven with them?' The guy answered, 'No, I'll simply go to hell with you. ... '

—Part of Tennessee Senator Albert Gore Sr.'s statement to Kennedy after the spoken communication^[67]

Reaction from Congress was mixed. Southern legislators despised the oral communication. Senator John Stennis, a staunch segregationist, vowed to resist Kennedy's proposals, declaring that they were "clearly unconstitutional and would open up the door for police control of employment and personal associations in nearly every field."^[68] Richard Russell Jr. claimed that passing such a nib would be the get-go of a transformation into "a socialistic or communist state." Senator Strom Thurmond suggested that Southern Democrats boycott Kennedy's legislative agenda in its entirety until he backed downwards on civil rights.^[53] Senator Allen Ellender argued that the President's propositions would "mean violence. He has all the laws on the statute books now if he wants employ them, only he seems instead to want to follow the advice of Negro leaders and agitators."^[60] George Smathers, a longtime friend of Kennedy, said, "I could concur with nearly everything the President said, just I don't really believe we need boosted legislation. There are plenty of laws on the statute books, and the way the courts accept been operating, there is no demand of boosted legislation to give the Negro his every right."^[60] Senator Albert Gore Sr. telephoned Kennedy to inform him that some of his constituents had called to voice their objections to integration.^[67] Other senators, especially Republicans Everett Dirksen and Thomas Kuchel were more receptive to Kennedy'due south ideas, the latter saying, "Neither degree nor creed have whatever function in our American arrangement. If the President maintains vigorous leadership, all Americans and Congress volition follow." Jacob Javits, a liberal member of Republican Party, expressed back up for Kennedy'due south proposals but conveyed his thwarting that the move for new legislation had non been made earlier, saying, "Improve late than never."^[60]

The day after the speech a motion in the House of Representatives to boost funding to the Area Redevelopment Administration as requested by Kennedy suffered a surprising defeat, 209–204, because of the opposition of Southern Democrats. Their rejection of the bill was widely viewed as a revolt against the President for his stance on ceremonious rights.^[69] In discussing the failure with Business firm Majority Leader Carl Albert, Kennedy lamented, "Ceremonious rights did it."^[53] When historian and presidential adviser Arthur K. Schlesinger Jr. complemented Kennedy on his remarks, the latter bitterly replied, "Yeah, and look at what happened to expanse evolution the very next day in the House." He then added, "But of class, I had to give that speech, and I'm glad that I did."^[seventy]

Ceremonious rights legislation [edit]

Get-go folio of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The week after the spoken communication was marked by vigorous legislative activity as the Justice Department worked on finishing Kennedy's proposals while Democratic leadership discussed strategies for enacting them.^[71] On June xix, Kennedy sent his ceremonious rights nib to Congress. In improver to his proposals made in February, the bill chosen for equal accommodations in public facilities, provisions for the Attorney General to initiate schoolhouse desegregation suits, new programs to ensure fair employment practices such as support of a Fair Employment Practice Committee, the establishment of a Customs Relations Service, and the granting of authority to the federal authorities to withhold funds from programs and activities in which discrimination occurred.^[72] In a speech before a articulation session, Kennedy implored Congress to pass information technology, warning that legislative inaction would event in "connected, if non increased, racial strife—causing the leadership on both sides to pass from the easily of reasonable and responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence, endangering domestic tranquility, retarding our Nation's economic and social progress and weakening the respect with which the balance of the world regards us."^[73]

Vice-President Johnson had misgivings about the success of a civil rights bill, at to the lowest degree until appropriations were passed.^[72] Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield was convinced that mandating the desegregation of public accommodations was unconstitutional.^[74] At the same fourth dimension, civil rights leaders—though they recognized the fact that the bill was the well-nigh comprehensive civil rights legislation always to be considered by Congress—wanted more provisions.^[72] Meanwhile, members of the Kennedy administration lobbied in Congress. Secretary Rusk spoke of the Soviet Marriage's efforts to portray the U.s. as racist, and Robert Kennedy testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on conditions in the segregated South. The President wanted the beak to pass before the November 1964 elections to foreclose it from condign a central campaign issue.^[75]

In the end, the nigh song support for the civil rights bill came from the participants of the Baronial 28 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. The demonstration made Kennedy anxious, only its organizers ensured that it would exist used to support his legislation.^[74] The 16th Street Baptist Church building bombing (in which four black choir girls were killed) in September increased public back up for the bill, but legislative progress stagnated in Congress due to the efforts of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans.^[76] In an interview that month, the President acknowledged the political cost of his new stance on civil rights: "It has caused a skillful bargain of feeling confronting the Administration in the Southward—as well, I suppose, in other parts of the country. ... I lost some southern states in 1960 so I suppose I will lose some, maybe more, in 1964. I am not sure that I am the most popular figure in the land today in the South, but that is all right."^[77] Still, he remained optimistic about his legislation, commenting in his last-ever printing conference on Nov 14, "Notwithstanding night the land looks now, I remember that 'westward await, the state is brilliant,' and I think that next summer it may be."^[76] On November 22, 1963 Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Johnson was immediately sworn in every bit President and addressed a joint session of Congress, saying, "No memorial oration or eulogy could more than eloquently honor President Kennedy's retentivity than the earliest possible passage of the ceremonious rights bill for which he fought so long."^[78] After an intense legislative try, the beak was approved by Congress and was signed into law past Johnson as the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964.^[79]

Legacy [edit]

Kennedy'southward finest moment as president showcased his development from a cautious pol into a world leader assuming plenty to deliver perhaps the finest speech always on race relations.

—Historian Peniel Eastward. Joseph, 2013^[fourscore]

The address was Kennedy'south most dramatic statement on African-American civil rights.^[7] Information technology transformed the political discourse of the bailiwick from that of a legal issue to that of a moral one.^{[45] [g]} The emotional affect of the oration was enhanced by the fact that information technology had occurred simply a day after Kennedy'south American University speech, putting it in the context of a greater political moment.^[51] Sorensen asserted that information technology signified the terminate of manifest resistance to university desegregation by state governments.^[58] It indicated a pregnant shift in policy for the Kennedy assistants, which, from that indicate on, assumed the goals of the ceremonious rights motility.^[73] Historian Carl Bauer said that the spoken communication "marked a turning point" for the President, who then became a central figure of the ceremonious rights movement, and signified the beginning of a "2nd Reconstruction" in which all three branches of the federal regime worked together to ensure the rights of African Americans.^[82]

Sorensen considered the accost one of Kennedy's almost important speeches, second only to the American University speech.^[83] Louis E. Martin called information technology "the well-nigh forthright argument ever made on civil rights."^[49] In an editorial appearing in The New York Times on June 11, 2013, historian Peniel E. Joseph wrote of the oration equally "Kennedy's finest moment."^{[84] [85]} Kennedy's posthumous reputation as a primal proponent of civil rights is largely because of the speech communication.^[86] In another written piece on the 50th anniversary of Kennedy's death, Joseph asserted that past delivering the speech Kennedy had "[i]n one fell swoop ... placed himself not just on the side of the civil rights movement, only equally one of that movement'south champions."^[80]

See also [edit]

• Law Day Address
• "I Have a Dream"

Notes [edit]

1. ^ Kennedy spoke in favor of civil rights in broad terms on June six at San Diego State University and on June 9 at the United states Conference of Mayors only his remarks garnered picayune public attention.^[18]
2. ^ Cohen determines that Kennedy must have watched a delayed circulate of the standoff in Alabama and instructed Sorensen to set up remarks only old after 5:twoscore p.thousand.^[32]
3. ^ Yates was finished with his draft past the morning of June 11, producing disquisitional remarks that were "curt, eloquent, and stark". In their 1964 oral history, Robert Kennedy and his deputy, Burke Marshall, maintained that it was "unsatisfactory." Sorensen, who said that up to his instruction from the President, no spoken communication had been written, patently never saw it. Fifty-fifty if he had, information technology fabricated niggling difference; none of Yates' work was used.^[22] Figuring that his ain work was too bleak for the President's utilize, Yates all the same expected that excerpts of it would be employed and was disappointed to detect otherwise when he viewed the address on boob tube.^[33]
4. ^ Hollars expressed doubts nigh Hood'south recollection, writing, "[T]he timelines don't sync upwardly. Kennedy may take called Hood to ask permission to publicly praise the student, though given the speech'south terminal minute edits, information technology would have been all but incommunicable for Hood to take received the final version prior to the rest of the land."^[36]
5. ^ According to some accounts, Kennedy was brought pages of the oral communication as they were completed, receiving some as he was speaking, but that cannot be seen in the television broadcast.^[37]
6. ^ Kennedy moderated some of Sorensen's language. For example, Sorensen's call for Congress "to act, boldly" and "to requite the enforceable right to be served in facilities which are open to the public" became Kennedy'southward "to act" and "to give."^[45] The speechwriter later said that while the speech had been "toned down, its substance remained."^[36]
7. ^ Gardner disagrees with the assessment that Kennedy was the get-go president to discuss civil rights in moral terms, writing that "so many contemporary journalists ... [have] failed to take appropriate notice of [President Harry S. Truman]'southward June 29, 1947, voice communication to the NAACP—a public address that was delivered xvi years before John Kennedy finally acted decisively on civil rights."^[81]

Citations [edit]

1. ^ ^{a b c} Ashley & Jarmer 2015, p. 115.
2. ^ ^{a b} Shogan 2007, p. 119.
3. ^ Shogan 2007, p. 118.
4. ^ ^{a b} Goduti Jr. 2012, p. 205.
5. ^ Ashley & Jarmer 2015, pp. 115–116.
6. ^ ^{a b c d} Ashley & Jarmer 2015, p. 116.
7. ^ ^{a b} Dudziak 2011, p. 179.
8. ^ Dallek 2003, p. 589.
9. ^ Goldzwig & Dionisopolous 1989, pp. 187–188.
10. ^ Pauley 2001, p. 156.
11. ^ Dallek 2003, pp. 590–592, 594.
12. ^ Rosenberg & Karabell 2003, pp. 86–87.
13. ^ Dudziak 2011, pp. 170–171.
14. ^ Shogan 2007, p. 123.
15. ^ Goldzwig & Dionisopolous 1989, p. 189.
16. ^ Sorensen 1999, p. 494.
17. ^ Schlesinger 2008, p. 134.
18. ^ Goldzwig & Dionisopolous 1989, p. 190.
19. ^ ^{a b c d e} Schlesinger 2008, p. 135.
20. ^ Shogan 2007, p. 124.
21. ^ ^{a b} Sloyan 2015, p. 151.
22. ^ ^{a b} Cohen 2016, pp. 286–287.
23. ^ Matthews 2017, p. 244.
24. ^ Drew, Robert (Director) (1963). Crisis: Behind a Presidential Commitment (Television product). ABC News/Drew Associates.
25. ^ Clarke 2013, Wednesday, August 28: Washington.
26. ^ ^{a b c d e} Bernstein 1991, p. 101.
27. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 285.
28. ^ ^{a b c d} Schlesinger 2008, p. 136.
29. ^ Clark 1995, p. 221.
30. ^ O'Brien 2006, p. 838.
31. ^ Dudziak 2011, pp. 180–181.
32. ^ Cohen 2016, pp. 285–286.
33. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 291.
34. ^ Guthman & Shulman 1988, p. 199.
35. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 286.
36. ^ ^{a b c} Hollars 2013, p. 98.
37. ^ ^{a b c d e} Cohen 2016, p. 331.
38. ^ Reeves 2011, p. 521.
39. ^ ^{a b} Cohen 2016, p. 337.
40. ^ Dallek 2003, pp. 602–606.
41. ^ Bradley 1965, pp. 172–173.
42. ^ Duncan 2013, pp. 153–154.
43. ^ ^{a b c} Duncan 2013, p. 154.
44. ^ ^{a b} Dallek 2003, pp. 604–606.
45. ^ ^{a b} Smith & Smith 1994, p. 148.
46. ^ Cohen 2016, pp. 337–338.
47. ^ ^{a b c d} Cohen 2016, p. 339.
48. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 341.
49. ^ ^{a b} Sabato 2013, p. 115.
50. ^ Matthews 2017, p. 246.
51. ^ ^{a b c d} Dudziak 2011, p. 181.
52. ^ Ashley & Jarmer 2015, p. 123.
53. ^ ^{a b c} Risen 2014, p. 69.
54. ^ Martin, Michael (host) (November 20, 2013). "JFK And Civil Rights: It's Complicated". Tell Me More. National Public Radio. Retrieved October one, 2017.
55. ^ Tye 2016, p. 229.
56. ^ Carter 2013, p. 157.
57. ^ Martin, Douglas (May half-dozen, 2008). "Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at 68". The New York Times . Retrieved August 23, 2017.
58. ^ ^{a b} Goldzwig & Dionisopolous 1989, p. 191.
59. ^ "The Civil Rights Deed of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom". Library of Congress. Retrieved 24 April 2017.
60. ^ ^{a b c d e} Cohen 2016, p. 340.
61. ^ ^{a b} Goduti Jr. 2012, p. 206.
62. ^ ^{a b c} Shogan 2007, p. 125.
63. ^ Cohen 2016, pp. 340–341.
64. ^ Dudziak 2011, p. 182.
65. ^ ^{a b c} Duncan 2013, p. 155.
66. ^ Sorensen 1999, p. 496.
67. ^ ^{a b} Reeves 2011, p. 525.
68. ^ Cohen 2016, pp. 339–340.
69. ^ Savage 2012, p. 186.
70. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 357.
71. ^ Risen 2014, pp. 71–72.
72. ^ ^{a b c} Schlesinger 2002, p. 966.
73. ^ ^{a b} Dudziak 2011, p. 180.
74. ^ ^{a b} Brinkley 2012, p. 110.
75. ^ Duncan 2013, pp. 154–155.
76. ^ ^{a b} Brinkley 2012, p. 111.
77. ^ Shogan 2007, p. 126.
78. ^ Loevy 1997, p. 356.
79. ^ Loevy 1997, p. 361.
80. ^ ^{a b} Joseph, Peniel E. (November 22, 2013). "JFK's 1963 Race Speech Made Him an African-American Icon". The Root . Retrieved August 23, 2017.
81. ^ Gardner 2002, p. 32.
82. ^ Rosenberg & Karabell 2003, p. 114.
83. ^ Sorensen 1988, p. ii.
84. ^ Joseph, Peniel Due east. (June 11, 2013). "Kennedy'south Finest Moment". The New York Times. p. A23.
85. ^ "'The Terminal Word with Lawrence O'Donnell' for Tuesday, June 11th, 2013". The Last Word with Lawrence O'Donnell. June 11, 2013. MSNBC. 'The Final Word with Lawrence O'Donnell' for Tuesday, June 11th, 2013.
86. ^ Walker 2012, p. 203.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Report_to_the_American_People_on_Civil_Rights

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